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For many years, cities and towns across the U.S. have been dealing with the
dilemma of rising municipal solid waste (MSW) generation and declining capacity of
aging landfills. In response, public officials have begun to implement new policies
aimed at encouraging source reduction and waste diversion through increased recy-
cling activity. Because the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) gives
states the responsibility for nonhazardous waste management, these efforts have not
been symmetric across the nation. Nonetheless, certain trends have become appar-
ent, including the increased use of curbside services and the adoption of unit pricing
schemes, or so-called “pay-as-you-throw” programs, to achieve local objectives.
Because of its market orientation, unit pricing, or variable-rate pricing as it is
sometimes known, has become an important focus of recent economic research. The
premise of unit pricing is simple. Each unit of waste disposed has an explicit price,
such that the total fee paid for MSW services increases with the quantity of waste
discards. Hence, the unit price acts as a disincentive to dispose excess waste and, in
theory, can be adjusted to achieve state or local disposal targets. In the absence of
such a pricing scheme, municipalities conventionally charge a flat fee for disposal
services, which, by definition, is independent of waste generation. Under such an
approach, the household faces a marginal price of zero for every unit of waste disposed
beyond the first, which in turn means it has no economic incentive to lower genera-
tion or to divert waste through recycling. This problem is exacerbated if the flat fee is
collected through property taxes and hence hidden from residents. The associated
misperception is that the marginal price of all units of waste disposed – even the first
– is zero. Since this flat fee approach ignores the true marginal costs of providing222 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
MSW services, the outcome is an inefficient solution with too many resources allo-
cated to MSW disposal and hence greater stress on landfill capacity.
Although unit pricing is not new, it has become more commonplace in the last
decade or so. According to a 1998 survey, there are over 4,100 municipalities in the
U.S. using some type of unit pricing plan [Hui, 1999].1 Predictably, as this policy re-
form has taken root, researchers have begun to investigate unit pricing along with
complementary policy instruments to determine if the intended effect is being real-
ized and, if so, to what extent. The provision of curbside recycling services is an ex-
ample of a complementary, incentive-based instrument actively used at the local level.
If a town picks up recyclables at the curb, it directly reduces the opportunity costs of
recycling. The expected outcome is higher recycling levels and reduced disposal. In
some research studies, the question under investigation is whether the presence of
such curbside services affects the influence of unit pricing. Callan and Thomas [1997],
for example, find that unit pricing has a significantly stronger effect on a community’s
recycling rate when curbside recycling is offered simultaneously.
Conventionally, researchers treat unit pricing and curbside services as exogenous
variables when estimating recycling or disposal demand functions. However, in a re-
cent demand analysis, Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000] show that these policy instru-
ments ought to be modeled as endogenous variables, since they tend to vary with
town attributes and household characteristics. The underlying argument is that pub-
lic policy should be responsive to the constituency and to local conditions in the com-
munity.
Following this premise, this research examines the demand for disposal and the
demand for recycling services for Massachusetts cities and towns, allowing for the
endogeneity of unit pricing levels and the provision of MSW curbside services.2 How-
ever, unlike Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000], who treat disposal demand and recycling
demand as separate functions, we argue that these are simultaneously determined.
To that end, we estimate these two demand functions at the community level of analy-
sis, using a systems approach to allow for their simultaneous determination. We be-
lieve this approach and the associated results make an important contribution to this
research area. Our model specifies a combination of socio-economic, demographic,
and policy determinants, assuming endogeneity of unit pricing levels and curbside
services for both disposal and recycling.
To give context to this study and to elucidate its contribution to MSW research,
we provide an overview of the relevant literature in the next section. The theoretical
model is subsequently presented and discussed, followed by an exposition of the em-
pirical model and data. Next, we present the results of the estimation and close with
concluding remarks.
THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature dealing with the demand for MSW services has been evolving over
the past decade. Early research focuses on the demand for disposal services, while
more recent papers have begun to include some aspect of recycling activity. The objec-
tive is to develop a better understanding of how disposal and recycling decisions are223 ANALYZING DEMAND FOR DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING SERVICES
related, which in turn can help motivate state and local policy initiatives. Some of
these analyses examine MSW decisions at the household level, such as Fullerton and
Kinnaman [1996], Nestor and Podolsky [1998], Hong [1999], and Hong and Adams
[1999]. Others focus on the disposal and/or recycling activity of the community as a
whole, such as Jenkins [1993], Miranda and Aldy [1998], Podolsky and Spiegel [1998],
and Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000]. Three of these articles are of particular rel-
evance to this research, so we discuss their salient points next.
Hong [1999] uses an international venue for his household-level study of unit
pricing, employing survey data from 3,017 households in Korea.3 Unique to this study
is the development of a theoretical and empirical model that explicitly accounts for
presumed simultaneity between generation and recycling. A particular focus is the
presence of feedback effects between generation and recycling, which in turn are
expected to influence the net effect of unit price changes. Hong’s underlying hypoth-
esis is that a higher recycling rate, which can arise from higher disposal fees, will in
turn give rise to increased generation, since greater recycling activity may cause
households to be less aggressive in pursuing source reduction practices. To assess the
potential of such feedback effects, Hong specifies a two-equation model with genera-
tion and recycling as dependent variables. Unit price is assumed endogenous and
appears in both equations. Recycling rate is allowed to influence waste generation,
and waste generation appears as a regressor in the recycling equation.
Employing a three-stage least squares (3SLS) approach, Hong generates estimates
that suggest that higher fees promote increased recycling activity but do not statisti-
cally influence generation directly. He further finds that feedback effects do exist.
Accordingly, he reports price and income elasticities that account for these feedback
effects, using reduced-form equations, although the derivations are not apparent. Hong
asserts that the price elasticity associated with generation is actually positive at 0.121
when feedback effects are considered, rather than negative as the price coefficient in
the generation equation suggests. He also derives a cross-price recycling elasticity of
0.457, which is of higher magnitude when generated from the reduced-form equation,
and an income-generation elasticity of 0.088, which is of lower magnitude when de-
rived from a reduced form.4
Podolsky and Spiegel [1998], who use community-level data for 149 New Jersey
municipalities, investigate the effect of unit pricing on MSW disposal demand. As
suggested by their theoretical model, these researchers find statistical support for a
negative relationship between the unit price level and the quantity demanded of dis-
posal services. They further estimate that the price elasticity of demand is equal to
-0.39, which aligns with the findings of Jenkins [1993] and others. However, what
distinguishes this result is that it is based on a disposal demand equation in which
recycling, assumed to be exogenous, is explicitly held constant. Hence, their elasticity
estimate is truly measuring the price-induced change in disposal arising from adjust-
ments in any disposal alternative except recycling.
In their empirical model, Podolsky and Spiegel hypothesize that a community’s
recycling activity affects disposal demand through two components. The first is a
nonprice component, whereby a community’s increased recycling activity should re-
sult in less waste disposal because the two activities are substitutes, holding price224 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
constant. The second is a price component, which they argue acts as an indirect price
effect. This refers to the expectation that a higher price on disposal should encourage
more recycling, which in turn would lower disposal activity. This indirect price effect
is incremental to a direct price effect, whereby a price rise directly reduces disposal
because it should encourage lower generation or source reduction. Podolsky and Spiegel
attempt to capture the price component, or indirect price effect, through an interac-
tion term between household recycling and a dummy variable for unit pricing. How-
ever, although both the nonprice component and the direct price effect are each found
to be negative and significant, the indirect price effect is not statistically significant.
A more recent study by Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000] significantly advances the
research in MSW demand. In this paper, the authors estimate separate demand func-
tions for MSW disposal and recycling services using a sample of 908 U.S. communi-
ties. Critical to their analysis is the assumption that local policy decisions, specifically
the unit price level and the provision of curbside recycling services, are endogenous.
Since most existing studies in MSW demand assume that policy changes are exog-
enous, this research effectively calls into question these earlier results, most notably
responses to unit pricing programs and associated estimates of price elasticities.
Because of the endogeneity assumption, the authors employ a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) approach to conduct their estimation. Consistent with prior research
studies, Kinnaman and Fullerton find that disposal demand is relatively price inelas-
tic. Depending on the underlying assumptions, they present estimates ranging from
–0.034 to –0.778 along with a calculated arc elasticity of –0.28. The authors suggest
that their relatively large estimates of –0.28 and –0.778 are the result of treating local
policies as endogenous. They further indicate, through a comparison of OLS and 2SLS
results, that existing studies based on an assumption of price exogeneity may substan-
tially underestimate the price responsiveness of MSW disposal demand.
From their recycling services equation, Kinnaman and Fullerton derive a point
estimate of the cross-price elasticity of 0.22.5 However, the parameter estimate on
unit price in the recycling equation is not significant, so any assertion about the de-
gree of substitutability between recycling and disposal services is not statistically sup-
ported in their 2SLS model. They also find that a community’s decision to offer curbside
recycling services has a significant effect on recycling demand, but no analogous rela-
tionship was found on the disposal side.6
THE THEORETICAL MODEL
A distinctive aspect of the present research is the specification of an MSW
demand model that allows for the simultaneity of demand for disposal and recycling
services.7 The simultaneity is important in that it captures the concurrent nature of
disposal and recycling decisions by households. The demand for illegal dumping is also
part of this set of decisions, though it is not observed and hence not measurable.
Consequently, the demand system for each community is modeled as follows:
(1) QDISP= f(PersonH, Income, Educ, Age, Den, PDISP, FreqREC, QREC), and225 ANALYZING DEMAND FOR DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING SERVICES
(2) QREC = f(PersonH, Income, Educ, Age, Den, PDISP, FreqDISP, Grant),
where equations (1) and (2) represent the demands for disposal and recycling, respec-
tively. The dependent variables and demand determinants for each equation are de-
fined in Table 1.
TABLE 1
List of MSW Variables and Definitions
Variable Definition
QDISP average number of tons of MSW disposed per person each year
QREC average number of tons of MSW recycled per person each year
PersonH average number of persons per household in the town
Income income per capita in thousands of dollars
Educ percentage of the town’s population that has received a baccalaureate education
Age median age of the town’s residents
Den housing density measured as the number of housing units per square mile of area
PDISP the average price in cents per gallon of waste disposed in the town1
FreqREC frequency of curbside recycling services quantified as number of pick-ups per month2
FreqDISP frequency of curbside disposal services quantified as number of pick-ups per month3
Grant dollar value of state-funded grants per thousand residents that the town received for
recycling equipment and/or educational materials
1. Following the recent literature, towns that do not use a unit pricing scheme are assigned a value
of 0 for PDISP [Podolsky and Spiegel, 1998; Kinnaman and Fullerton, 2000]. Also, to convert prices
per pound to prices per gallon, we used a conversion following Repetto, Dower, Jenkins and
Geoghegan [1992] as cited in Van Houtven and Morris [1999].
2. To avoid collinearity problems, this variable is formed as the product of two variables, one measur-
ing the number of pick ups per month and the other a dummy variable to identify towns offering
curbside services.
3. This variable is formed analogously to FreqREC, which is described above.
A few general observations are worthy of note. First, the theoretical framework
for such MSW demand functions generated from utility maximization is supported in
the literature and hence is not repeated here [Podolsky and Spiegel, 1998; Kinnaman
and Fullerton, 2000]. Second, the variables included in these demand functions follow
the MSW empirical literature. Third, each demand function is specified to reflect the
influence of three sets of factors: (i) household characteristics – PersonH, Income,
Educ, Age; (ii) a key town attribute – Den; and (iii) state and local policy instruments
– PDISP, FreqREC, FreqDISP, and Grant. The inclusion of household and demographic
variables is necessary to assure that the model properly controls for differences in
socio-economic conditions that might affect a community’s MSW behavior.
Within this system, we recognize the endogeneity of certain MSW policy deci-
sions, following Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000]. In our model, the relevant endog-
enous policy variables are PDISP, FreqREC, and FreqDISP.8 The logic of treating the unit
price of disposal and the frequency of recycling and disposal curbside services as en-
dogenous is that each of these policy instruments can and often does change in re-
sponse to residents’ behavior (which in turn is a function of household characteris-
tics), as well as the demography of the town itself.226 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Beginning with the household characteristics, the PersonH variable captures the
average household size in each municipality. Logically, we expect that total disposal
increases with household size. However, since the dependent variables in this model,
QDISP and QREC, are measured on a per capita basis, the PersonH measure could have
a negative influence on demand as discovered by Jenkins [1993] and Podolsky and
Spiegel [1998]. Podolsky and Spiegel add a quadratic term for this variable, and find
that this economizing influence is not without limit.
Predicting the qualitative effect of the Income variable is more difficult. With
regard to disposal demand, one expects that higher income households will consume
more goods, which in turn implies more waste generation and thus a higher demand
for disposal services. However, some argue that higher income families tend to do-
nate rather than discard certain goods [Richardson and Havlicek, 1975; 1978; Rathje
and Thompson, 1981], which implies a negative influence of income on MSW disposal
demand. Hence, if both factors are present, it is possible that the Income variable will
not significantly influence disposal demand.
On the recycling side, the expected effect of Income on demand is also ambiguous.
Commonly discussed is the higher opportunity cost of recycling faced by higher in-
come households, which in turn suggests that income and recycling are negatively
related. However, there are other factors that work in the opposite direction, making
the net effect indeterminate a priori. For example, higher income households gener-
ally possess the financial flexibility and opportunity to substitute more recyclable prod-
ucts for those that are not. Detail on such issues is reported in Saltzman, Duggal, and
Williams [1993].
Education is expected to negatively influence disposal demand and positively af-
fect recycling demand. More highly educated individuals tend to be more environmen-
tally aware, which suggests greater source reduction activity and hence lower waste
generation as well as more recycling [Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Granzin and Olsen,
1991; Lansana, 1992; Smith, 1995].
We anticipate that the Age variable will have a direct effect on disposal and recy-
cling demand, since consumption levels tend to increase as people grow older, at least
to a point. However, the empirical evidence on the effect of age on MSW services is
limited. Some researchers do not specify age as a determinant of MSW demand func-
tions, and among those that do, the results are not consistent. Podolsky and Spiegel
[1998] find that median age is inversely related to disposal. However, Jenkins [1993]
finds that age (measured as the proportion of the population between 18 and 49),
positively affects disposal demand. Richardson and Havlicek [1978] argue that waste
generation increases with age up through the middle years and then declines. We
think the latter two cases are the most plausible.
We specify a measure of housing density, Den, to capture an important town
attribute, as is conventionally done in the MSW literature. In this model, density
represents the number of housing units per square mile. Housing density helps to
characterize the community at large, including its opportunity for illegal dumping.
Towns with a higher propensity to illegally dispose of wastes, such as high-density or
low-density communities, are likely to have less demand for MSW disposal and recy-
cling services.9227 ANALYZING DEMAND FOR DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING SERVICES
Chief among the policy variables is the price per unit of MSW disposed, PDISP. Note
that it enters the disposal demand function as own price and the recycling demand
function as the price of a substitute service. Accordingly, in the disposal demand equa-
tion, PDISP should negatively affect QDISP, and in recycling demand, PDISP should posi-
tively affect QREC. The quantitative relationships between each of the two price re-
sponses are not necessarily offsetting, since a change in QDISP associated with a price
change might arise from source reduction, illegal dumping, or recycling. Since illegal
dumping is not observed, it cannot be directly measured. However, some inferences
are possible by including QREC in the disposal demand equation as a control variable.
In so doing, the response of QDISP to PDISP can be measured holding QREC constant,
which in turn captures any price-induced change in QDISP due to source reduction and/
or illegal disposal.
More formally, this specification allows us to estimate both the direct effect of
PDISP on QDISP and the indirect effect of PDISP on QDISP, where the latter operates through
QREC, as theorized by Podolsky and Spiegel [1998]. We also can assess the nonprice
influence of QREC on QDISP, which is expected to be negative due to the predicted substi-
tutability between disposal and recycling, holding PDISP constant. Lastly, because QREC
is present in the QDISP equation, the model allows for an analogous assessment of
direct and indirect effects with respect to other variables common to both functions,
such as income and education.10
Another key policy variable is the availability of curbside recycling services, which
is captured by the FreqREC variable in the QDISP demand equation. In Massachusetts,
78 percent of local communities have access to such services [Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, December 20, 2000, 2-10]. Of interest is to determine if the frequency of
curbside recycling services negatively influences the demand for disposal, as expected,
and if so, to what extent. Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000] include a variable for curbside
recycling in their disposal equation and find that it is insignificant in both their 2SLS
and OLS specifications. For symmetry and completeness, we include FreqDISP in the
recycling demand equation. Providing curbside disposal services is quite common in
most municipalities. Yet, this service likely acts as a disincentive to recycling activity,
so the expected qualitative effect of FreqDISP on QREC is also negative.11
Specific to the recycling demand equation is another policy variable, Grant. Like
other states around the nation, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts tries to encour-
age recycling activity by providing funding for recycling equipment and educational
materials, an effort that is to be continued under its new Beyond 2000 Solid Waste
Master Plan. To date, the Commonwealth has awarded over $17 million in grant
funding to 331 communities [Commonwealth of Massachusetts, December 20, 2000, 2-
11]. If this effort has been successful, we should expect the Grant variable to positively
influence recycling demand.
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
We estimate the two household demand equations for QDISP and QREC as a system.
The empirical specification of this system is:228 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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where μ
1 and μ
2  represent the respective disturbance terms for each equation.
Note that in the model, PersonH, Den, and Educ (in the recycling equation), enter
as quadratic terms, which is commonly done in the literature. Doing so allows the
model to capture any nonlinearity in the effect of each of these variables on the re-
spective quantity measures. We did attempt to include squared terms for other de-
mand determinants, including Educ in the disposal equation, Age, and Income, but
these efforts were unproductive, generating parameters that were not significant and
giving overall weaker results.
The inclusion of QREC in the QDISP equation allows us to decompose the influence of
PDISP on disposal demand into its direct effect and indirect effect through QREC, as
explained previously. This was the theoretical intent of Podolsky and Spiegel [1998],
though they were unable to support the endogeneity of QREC in their model. Based on
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The first term in equation (5),(/ ) ( / ) ∂∂ QP P Q
DISP DISP DISP DISP , or α
8(/) PQ
DISP DISP , rep-
resents the direct effect of unit price changes on disposal demand, with recycling held
constant. Consequently, this term captures any illegal disposal and/or source reduc-
tion activity that households engage in when faced with increases in the unit price
level. The second term in the equation, (/) (/ ) (/ ) ∂∂ ∂∂ [] QQ QP PQ
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or αβ
10 9(/) PQ
DISP DISP , is essentially derived from the reduced form equation for QDISP.
It estimates the indirect effect of price on disposal demand, i.e., the change in disposal
activity that arises from adjustments in recycling due to a change in the unit price
level.12 Note that without QREC in the QDISP function, the model could not discern what
type of adjustment had occurred to give rise to an observed change in waste disposal.
Analogous decompositions are possible for other variables. For example, the edu-
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Here, the first term,(/) ( / ) ∂∂ Q Educ Educ Q
DISP DISP , or α
4(/ ) Educ Q
DISP , represents the
sensitivity of disposal demand reacting directly to education changes, holding recy-
cling constant. The second term, (/) (/) ( / ) ∂∂ ∂∂ Q Q Q Educ Educ Q
DISP REC REC DISP , or
() ( / ) αβ αβ
10 4 10 5 2 + Educ Educ Q
DISP , is derived from the QDISP reduced-form equation. It
estimates how changes in education influence recycling, which in turn affects disposal
activity, i.e., an indirect effect.
The measures of quantity of MSW recycled per person, quantity of MSW disposed
per person, unit pricing, and all other policy variables used in the estimation are
formed from data obtained from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP).13 Variables for demographic and socio-economic measures are formed
from 1990 census data [U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990; Horner, 1994]. All 351
Massachusetts cities and towns are included in the estimation. Descriptive statistics
for each variable are provided in Table 2.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
We use an instrumental variables procedure to obtain consistent parameter esti-
mates, since each equation in the two-equation system is overidentified. A three-stage
least squares (3SLS) approach is used to conduct the estimation in accordance with
Zellner and Theil [1962]. The use of 3SLS implies rejection of the null hypothesis of
zero correlation between the errors of the two demand equations and the absence of230 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
simultaneity, i.e., zero correlation between at least one explanatory variable and the
error term in each equation.14
TABLE 2
Sample Statistics For MSW Variables













NOTE: All annual policy variables are based on the state’s fiscal year, which runs from July 1 to June 30.
In this model, we have effectively imposed correlation between one or more of the
explanatory variables and the respective error terms because of the assumed
endogeneity of PDISP, FreqREC, and FreqDISP. Further, we anticipate cross-equation cor-
relation of the errors because the demand for recycling and the demand for disposal
are likely determined in part by common factors, some of which might be immeasur-
able [Maddala, 1977, 331; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998, 359]. The results of the Hausman
test bear this out [Hausman, 1978].15
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the two-equation demand system.
Most of the results validate our expectations and are supported by existing literature.
We begin by analyzing the results for the disposal demand, equation (3). From an
overall perspective, we find that PersonH, PersonH2, Age, FreqREC, and QREC, are sta-
tistically significant determinants of this demand function. Though the direct effect of
PDISP has the expected negative sign, it is not statistically significant. However, we do
find that PDISP indirectly affects disposal demand through its influence on recycling
behavior and does so in a manner that is statistically significant.
The results show that the α
1 parameter on PersonH is negative and significant at
the 5 percent level, which follows Jenkins [1993]. Also, the α
2 parameter on PersonH2
is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Holding recycling constant, these
findings suggest that as household size grows, the quantity of disposal services de-
manded per capita decreases at a decreasing rate, which supports the findings of
Podolsky and Spiegel [1998].16 Because the estimated relationship is nonlinear, the
implication is that very small and very large households tend to demand higher amounts
of disposal services per capita. According to the α
1 and α
2estimates, the point at which
the quantity disposed would start to increase with household size is approximately 3
persons per household. Hence, there is an economizing effect up to that point.231 ANALYZING DEMAND FOR DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING SERVICES
We further find that the parameter on Age, α
5, is positive and significant at the 5
percent level. This indicates that, holding recycling constant, older individuals tend to
have a greater demand for disposal services, which likely reflects rising consumption
with age and hence increased waste generation. This is in keeping with the findings of
Jenkins [1993]. We tried including a quadratic term for Age to test for a nonlinear
relationship, but it was not significant, and its inclusion weakened the overall results.
TABLE 3
RESULTS OF 3SLS ESTIMATION OF THE DEMAND SYSTEM
PARAMETER VARIABLE ESTIMATE ASYMPTOTIC STANDARD ERROR
DISPOSAL DEMAND FUNCTION
α 0 Intercept 75.1816b 37.1128
α 1 PersonH            –57.2003b 26.2051
α 2 PersonH2 9.9935b 4.8443
α 3 Income 0.0557 0.1227
α 4 Educ 0.0677 0.1265
α 5 Age 0.3237b 0.1603
α 6 Den 0.0021 0.0017
α 7 Den2 –3.06E-7 2.522E-7
α 8 PDISP –0.1116 0.2331
α 9 FreqREC –1.9193b 0.9721
α 10 QREC –31.3493a 8.3249
RECYCLING DEMAND FUNCTION
β 0 Intercept 1.1409c 0.5879
β 1 PersonH             –0.9773b 0.4184
β 2 PersonH2  0.1736b 0.0780
β 3 Income 0.0025 0.0023
β 4 Educ 0.0165a 0.0057
β 5 Educ2 –0.0004c 0.0002
β 6 Age 0.0058b 0.0026
β 7 Den 4.80E-5 3.60E-5
β 8 Den2 –8.97E-9c 5.329E-9
β 9 PDISP 0.0071c 0.0038
β 10 FreqDISP      –0.0165 0.0127
β 11 Grant 8.121E-6 5.202E-6
a. significant at the .01 level, assuming a two-tailed test.
b. significant at the .05 level, assuming a two-tailed test.
c. significant at the .10 level, assuming a two-tailed test.
n  =  351
Though the α
4  parameter on Educ is not statistically significant, we calculated
the education elasticity values to assess the direct and indirect effects, as defined in232 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
equation (6). Interestingly, though theα
4 parameter is positive, the elasticity of dis-
posal with respect to education is estimated to be negative, at –2.483. This is so be-
cause the indirect effect, estimated to be –3.752 is much larger than the direct effect,
estimated at 1.270. Although we are unable to attribute statistical significance to
these elasticity values, it is of interest to note that education might be negatively
related to disposal because a more educated population tends to recycle more and
hence dispose less. 17 The absence of statistical significance for education follows the
findings of such researchers as Fullerton and Kinnaman [1996] and Hong and Adams
[1999]. This outcome might be the result of collinearity among certain of the demo-
graphic variables, which is not an atypical problem in models of this type. We tried
other specifications, including adding a quadratic term for Educ in the disposal equa-
tion, but no improvement was achieved.
We also do not find Income to be a significant determinant of disposal decisions.
This, too, has been found in other research studies, such as Nestor and Podolsky
[1998], for both curbside and offsite disposal, and Hong and Adams [1999]. In addition
to collinearity among demographic variables, the lack of significance for Income might
reflect the opposing influences of increased consumption and increased donation com-
monly linked to higher income levels, as noted previously.
Though not statistically significant, the algebraic signs of the town attributes
measured through Den and Den2 indicate that disposal demand increases at a decreas-
ing rate with density, holding recycling constant. This suggests that sparsely popu-
lated communities, such as rural areas, and those that are very densely populated,
such as urban areas, tend to be associated with lower disposal demand. Based on our
quantitative estimates, the point at which disposal starts to decline with density oc-
curs at 3,361 housing units per square mile. As suggested by Kinnaman and Fullerton
[2000], such an outcome might reflect easier access to illegal dumping activities in
rural and urban areas. Another possibility is that lower disposal in rural towns might
reflect increased composting and other types of reuse activity, and lower disposal in
urban areas might be linked to lower waste generation due to greater use of restau-
rants and other services outside the home.18
Notwithstanding the relative merits of socio-economic impacts on disposal de-
mand, the most important findings are the policy results, specifically the parameters
on PDISP and FreqREC. We begin with an analysis of the relationship between PDISP and
QDISP. First, using a one-tailed test, we observe that the joint parameter on PDISP,
() αα β
81 0 9 +  ,  is significant at the 10 percent level based on a standard error of 0.218.
As stated in equation (5), the price elasticity of disposal demand is measured
as() ( / ) αα β
81 0 9 + PQ
DISP DISP , which is estimated to be –0.582. This magnitude supports
the findings of other researchers, who also determine that disposal demand is price
inelastic.19 Table 4 presents this elasticity estimate and all key elasticity findings from
the estimation.
In this model, we also can examine the two components of this elasticity, defined
as α
8(/) PQ
DISP DISP and αβ
10 9(/) PQ
DISP DISP . According to the results, the estimate of the233 ANALYZING DEMAND FOR DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING SERVICES
first component,α
8(/) PQ
DISP DISP , evaluated at the point of means is –0.195, which rep-
resents the direct effect of price on disposal demand, holding recycling constant. This
estimate is directly analogous to the estimate of –0.39 by Podolsky and Spiegel [1998],
who explicitly hold recycling constant in their disposal demand equation. Assessing
this –0.195 value from the point of means translates to an annual decline in disposal of
about 2.62 pounds per person in direct response to a 1 percent rise in the unit price.
However, the parameter on PDISP,  α
8, is not statistically significant in our model,
which implies that the combination of illegal disposal and source reduction activities
in direct response to price changes is not significantly different from zero. Hence, it
might be the case that neither activity is present or that both activities are present
but are statistically offsetting.
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING DEMAND ELASTICITIES
ELASTICITY ESTIMATED VALUE
DISPOSAL
εQP DISP DISP –0.582
direct effect –0.195
indirect effect –0.387
εQ Freq DISP REC –3.588
RECYCLING
εQP REC DISP  0.054
εQ Freq REC DISP –0.194
εQG r a n t REC  0.017
εQ Educ REC  0.523
We further find that the second elasticity component,αβ
10 9(/) PQ
DISP DISP , which
captures the indirect price effect, is estimated to be –0.387, with the parameter () αβ
10 9
significant at the 10 percent level. This finding communicates that there is indeed a
disposal response to unit price changes by Massachusetts communities, but the reac-
tion operates through increased recycling. The specific magnitude, evaluated at the
point of means, translates to an annual decline of about 5.2 pounds of disposal per
person in response to a 1 percent price increase, which is quite reasonable.20 To our
knowledge, this response has not been measured heretofore in any MSW demand
analysis, since no investigation has successfully decomposed the influence of unit
price on disposal demand. Further, it is important to note that existing studies may234 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
seriously underestimate the price sensitivity of MSW disposal demand because of the
assumption of price exogeneity, as pointed out by Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000].
Availability of curbside recycling services, measured through FreqREC, is found to
be a negative and significant determinant of disposal demand, as anticipated. Specifi-
cally, α 9 has an estimated value of –1.919 and is significant at the 5 percent level. This
in turn suggests that if a municipality were to add one more pick up of recyclables per
month, individuals would decrease disposal by 1.919 tons per year. Although this is a
large magnitude, it bears noting that the mean value of FreqREC is 1.256. Hence, an
increase of a single pick-up per month would represent an 80 percent increase in that
service. As shown in Table 4, the relevant elasticity is estimated to be –3.588, which
implies that a 1 percent increase in the average FreqREC for a given town would give
rise to a 3.588 percent decline in disposal demand, or about 48.2 pounds per person
each year.
Turning our attention to the recycling equation (4), we observe that PersonH,
PersonH2, Educ, Educ2, Age, Den, Den2, PDISP, FreqDISP, and Grant are found to be
significant.21 To provide some symmetry to the analysis, we begin again with an ex-
amination of the household characteristics.
Analogous to the disposal estimation, the parameters on PersonH and PersonH2
in the recycling function, or  β
1 and β
2 respectively, are statistically significant. Since
β
1 is negative and β
2  is positive, the estimates imply that as household size increases,
recycling demand decreases at a decreasing rate. The negative  β
1  parameter is sen-
sible, since QREC is measured on a per capita basis. As on the disposal side, the nonlin-
ear relationship implies that very small and very large households tend to recycle
more MSW per capita. This also suggests that waste generation is higher and or
illegal disposal is lower for these groups. The specific values of β
1  and β
2  allow us to
estimate that the point at which QREC starts to rise with household size is 3, analogous
to the finding for disposal demand.
Unlike the results of the disposal estimation, we find that Educ is a significant
determinant of recycling demand. We further find that the relationship between Educ
and recycling demand is quadratic, suggesting that recycling per capita increases at a
decreasing rate with Educ. The positive relationship supports the theory that more
educated individuals tend to be more aware of the environmental risks of excess MSW
disposal [Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Granzin and Olsen, 1991; Lansana, 1992; Smith,
1995]. The quadratic relationship suggests that the positive influence of education on
recycling is not without limit and begins to diminish when the proportion of a town’s
residents with a baccalaureate education is greater than 21 percent.22
As noted in Table 4, the estimate of the education elasticity,
εβ β
Q Educ REC REC Educ Educ Q =+ () /
45 2 , is 0.523 evaluated at the point of means. This
implies that the demand for recycling is relatively inelastic with respect to education.
Specifically, for every 1 percentage increase in the education level of the town, recy-
cling activity is expected to be higher by 0.523 percent, or 1.61 pounds per person each
year.
Just as in the estimation of disposal demand, we find Age to be a significant deter-
minant of recycling demand at the 5 percent level. Again, the parameter estimate is
positive, which likely reflects increasing consumption and waste generation with age,235 ANALYZING DEMAND FOR DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING SERVICES
and hence greater demand for all MSW services, including recycling. A specification
including a quadratic term was tried, but the squared term was found to be insignifi-
cant.
We further find that the estimated parameter on Income,  β
3,bears a positive
sign. However, the lack of statistical significance suggests that recycling demand is
independent of income. This is in keeping with other studies in the literature, such as
Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000]. As to why this might be the case, it could be the
result of the inherent collinearity of socio-economic variables, such as education and
income. It is also possible that money income is simply not relevant to recycling
decisions.
Moving on to town density, the β
7  and β
8  parameters on Den and Den2, respec-
tively, suggest that low- and high-density communities tend to engage in the least
amount of recycling activity. This finding may be due to the greater access to illegal
disposal locations available to residents in urban and rural areas. Other explanations
are plausible, such as higher composting levels in rural areas, as discussed above.
There might also be varying levels in environmental consciousness across these groups
of communities.23 In any case, using the specific values from the estimation, we find
that recycling levels begin to decrease when density is approximately 2,676 housing
units per square mile.
Worthy of note are the results for the three policy instruments included in the
recycling equation, PDISP, FreqDISP, and Grant. This set of outcomes should prove very
valuable to state and local public officials. Of particular interest is the finding that
the β
9 parameter on PDISP is positive, as expected, and significant at the 10 percent
level. Its magnitude communicates that a 1 cent increase in the unit price per gallon
will give rise to an increase of 0.007 tons, or 14 pounds, of recycling per person each
year. Such a finding should help public officials justify the use of unit pricing programs
to their constituents. The associated cross-price elasticity, εβ
Q P DISP REC REC DISP PQ =
9(/) ,
evaluated at the mean equals 0.054. Its positive magnitude is sensible, given that
disposal services and recycling services are hypothesized to be substitute goods. More-
over, the fact that its value is less than unity is in keeping with analogous estimates
cited in the literature, such as U.S. EPA [1990], Fullerton and Kinnaman [1996], and
Hong [1999]. The inelasticity might reflect the difficulty some residents have substi-
tuting recycling for disposal because of space considerations associated with recycling
activity or the opportunity costs of associated tasks such as collection and storage.
With regard to frequency of curbside disposal services, the estimated β
10  param-
eter of –0.017 is significant at the 10 percent level, using a one-tailed test. The nega-
tive sign is intuitively logical, and the quantitative magnitude implies that if a munici-
pality offers one less curbside disposal pick up each month, recycling per person will
increase by 0.017 tons or 34 pounds per year. Notice that the response is considerably
smaller than the reaction to curbside recycling changes estimated in the disposal
equation. The associated elasticity value, εβ
Q Freq DISP REC REC DISP Freq Q =
10(/ ) ,evaluated at
the point of means is –0.194. Hence, a 10 percent decrease in the average frequency of
curbside disposal services would give rise to a 1.94 percent rise in recycling activity.236 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The effect of grant awards on the demand for recycling services is significant at
the 10 percent level, using a one-tailed test, and the  β
11 parameter bears the expected
positive sign. This direct relationship implies that individuals in communities receiv-
ing recycling grant monies for education or equipment are recycling more waste each
year than those who live in towns not funded by these grant awards. Because the
Grant variable is defined relative to town population, it captures the relative influence
of the award on the individual resident. Using the specific parameter estimates, we
calculate the relevant elasticity as εβ
Q Grant REC REC Grant Q =
11(/ ) , which in this case equals
0.017 evaluated at the point of means. This value indicates that a 10 percent increase
in grant dollars awarded per 1,000 people in a town (or, equivalently, a 0.01 percent
increase in grant dollars per capita), is expected to increase recycling by 0.52 pounds
per person. Such a finding should be of particular value to state and local officials in
establishing and implementing interjurisdictional grant programs.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
From a broad perspective, this research offers new findings on MSW disposal and
recycling demand based on a systems approach, which heretofore has not been em-
ployed in this context. In so doing, we believe that the model specification and the
empirical results offer important contributions to the growing literature in MSW de-
mand analysis, which we hope will encourage further study. At the same time, our
parameter estimates and associated demand elasticities have a practical application
for state and local public officials who are designing and implementing MSW manage-
ment programs and policies. Not only might the quantitative results aid in projecting
the gains of MSW policy reform, but they also might help to communicate the ex-
pected benefits of policy to various constituencies.
With regard to the model specification employed in this study, two critical obser-
vations are worthy of note. First, the model explicitly acknowledges the endogeneity
of the unit price level and the provision of both disposal and recycling curbside ser-
vices. While endogeneity is addressed by Hong [1999] and by Kinnaman and Fullerton
[2000], many other research studies have assumed otherwise, calling into question
qualitative and quantitative demand findings in earlier literature. Consequently, more
work is needed to determine the impact of this critical assumption in other contexts.
Second, the model explicitly recognizes the close relationship between disposal and
recycling decisions. The expected simultaneity results in cross-equation error correla-
tion, which in turn necessitates a systems approach to estimating the model. This
approach, coupled with the use of an intrastate data set of 351 municipalities, allows
us to investigate responses to public policy instruments in a well-defined empirical
context, which by construction improves the efficiency of the results.
Notwithstanding the value of our findings on socio-economic demand determi-
nants, the most critical empirical results are those that directly address MSW policy.
As others have suggested, though sometimes without statistical support, we find that
disposal decisions are negatively related to changes in the unit price level and that
recycling activity is positively related. However, because of our model’s specification,237 ANALYZING DEMAND FOR DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING SERVICES
we are able to distinguish those disposal decisions in direct response to price from
those that arise as an indirect response to price through recycling activity. This dis-
tinction sheds new light on the important interaction of recycling and disposal, which
is not totally unrelated to Hong’s [1999] finding of a feedback effect between recycling
and generation. Furthermore, because of the identification of a direct and indirect
effect, we can make some inferences about source reduction and illegal disposal, though
the absence of data on illegal disposal at the community level prevents any sweeping
conclusions.
At the local level in Massachusetts, it appears that the primary disposal reaction
to unit price changes comes about because of individual access to and participation in
recycling as an alternative to disposal. Indeed, the parameter estimates in this model
indicate that a 1 percent increase in unit pricing achieves an annual reduction of 5.2
pounds of waste disposed per person solely because individuals move toward the rela-
tively cheaper substitute activity of recycling, though the exact disposition of the dis-
placed disposal is not identifiable. To our knowledge, such a response has not previ-
ously been estimated in the literature, since no prior study has decomposed the effect
of unit price on disposal demand. Perhaps other researchers can replicate this ap-
proach in other contexts to determine if similar findings are obtained.
In addition to investigating price sensitivity, we also find that a community’s deci-
sion to offer curbside services has a significant influence on disposal and recycling
demand. The empirical results provide evidence that the expected incentives do in
fact operate. More curbside disposal services discourage recycling, and more curbside
recycling services discourage disposal, validating the expected influence of opportu-
nity costs on household MSW decisions. Again, this is practical information for local
officials responsible for setting MSW policy and realizing MSW targets.
We further determine that the state’s provision of community-based recycling
grants provides an added incentive for residents to increase recycling activity. In Mas-
sachusetts, these monetary incentives operate through the funding of educational
materials or investment in recycling equipment. Evidence of the effectiveness of these
grant awards has a practical value to public officials in designing or reforming MSW
grant programs. In fact, all the policy-related findings of this research provide support
for implementing certain MSW initiatives, and the associated elasticities can help
officials forecast expected results.
Beyond the policy implications of this analysis, the findings about density also are
of interest and may even influence MSW program design in certain communities.
Specifically, the results suggest that urban and rural communities are those in which
lower levels of both disposal and recycling activities are observed. One argument is
that these communities might be those where illegal dumping is more prevalent. This
possibility has been suggested by other researchers but often has not been supported
empirically. Alternative explanations are also possible. For example, rural areas might
dispose and recycle less because their residents substitute composting for disposal
more than those in others communities. In any case, officials in such communities
might be motivated by the density findings to investigate the extent of such behavior
as well as the potential for illegal dumping.238 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In sum, we hope that future research will replicate our approach and our specifi-
cation to determine if these findings are observed in other contexts. In so doing, the
accumulation of empirical evidence can help build consensus, which in turn should aid
public officials in designing and implementing effective MSW policy.
NOTES
1. The 1998 Solid Waste Survey was funded by the Solid Waste Association of North America and the
American Plastics Council. The findings corroborate those of a Duke University estimate of over
3,800 communities using unit pricing in 1998.
2. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts provides a relevant context for the empirical estimation
because of its aggressive solid waste plan launched in 1990 [Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
June 1990]. This plan defined waste management objectives for the subsequent ten-year period
and outlined policies and strategies to achieve those goals. Recently, the state announced its new
plan, Beyond 2000 Solid Waste Master Plan – A New Framework, to continue these efforts through
the next decade [Commonwealth of Massachusetts, December 20, 2000]. Among the policies
promoted by the state are “pay-as-you-throw” disposal programs, recycling grants, and education
to improve recycling participation rates.
3. In a similar analysis, Hong and Adams [1999] investigate households’ responses to unit pricing
based on sample data from Portland, Oregon. Their results suggest that for a given container size,
household MSW disposal and recycling demands respond predictably to unit price changes.
4. Unfortunately, Hong provides neither methodology nor standard errors for these reduced form
estimates, so it is not known if these elasticities are statistically significant.
5. This result is much larger than the cross price elasticity of 0.073 reported in Fullerton and Kinnaman
[1996] and lower than the 0.457 value reported by Hong [1999].
6. Regarding the conventional community characteristics such as income, education, and household
size, Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000] obtain results that generally conform to the existing litera-
ture. However, the majority of the community variables they specify are not statistically signifi-
cant in explaining either demand function.
7. Interestingly, Podolsky and Spiegel [1998] initially specified a system of simultaneous equations
for disposal demand and recycling demand for their study. However, the results of the Hausman
[1978] test did not support the assumed endogeneity of recycling in their model. The authors
suggest that the structure of recycling programs in New Jersey may have contributed to this
outcome. Specifically, the state had imposed mandatory recycling since 1987, and most communi-
ties in New Jersey offer curbside recycling services.
8. Grant is not specified as an endogenous variable, since grant monies are awarded based on a
town’s recycling performance in prior periods.
9. Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000] argue this point, suggesting that low-density communities, or
more rural areas, have remote locations where illegal dumping may occur and that high-density
towns, or urban communities, are those with greater access to commercial dumpsters, which
would facilitate illegal dumping.
10. Hong [1999] uses a similar approach in estimating generation and recycling to allow for a determi-
nation of what he calls feedback effects across equations.
11. We attempted to include both frequency measures in both equations, but doing so made most of
the corresponding parameters insignificant. This is likely due to the fact that FreqREC and FreqDISP
are highly correlated.
12. See Podolsky and Spiegel [1998, 30] for a graphical depiction of these two effects.
13. We wish to express our appreciation to John Crisley and John Fischer at the Massachusetts DEP
for their assistance in making these data available and for explaining the state’s data collection
methods and variable definitions. Specific data sources for the model are U.S. Department of
Commerce [1990], Horner [1994], and Commonwealth of Massachusetts [1994; 1996; 1997; 1998;
1999; July 2000].
14. Though the parameter estimates from forming the instrumental variables, PDISP, FreqREC, and
FreqDISP, are not of particular interest, it is relevant to report that the overall fit of the equations is239 ANALYZING DEMAND FOR DISPOSAL AND RECYCLING SERVICES
acceptable. Adjusted R2
 statistics for the instrumental variables estimation of these variables are
0.488, 0.233, and 0.292, respectively. Specific parameter estimates are available from the authors
upon request.
15. We apply the Hausman specification test to our use of 3SLS relative to OLS [Hausman, 1978]. The
estimated test statistic, which is distributed as a  χ
2
with 18 degrees of freedom, is 26.81 and is
significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there
is significant contemporaneous cross-equation correlation in the simultaneous system. In such a
case, ordinary least squares estimation of this model would be inefficient, and hence the use of
3SLS is warranted.
16. This same relationship obtains even if recycling is not held constant, though the resulting coeffi-
cients on PersonH and PersonH2 are smaller. This decrease in their values occurs because in
determining∂∂ Q PersonH
DISP / , the PersonH and PersonH2 parameters in the recycling equation
are multiplied by α
10,  which logically is negative.
17. For the indirect effect of education, i.e.,αβ β
10 4 5 2 () + Educ , we find a standard error of 0.178, and
for the combined effect of education, i.e.,αα β β
41 0 4 5 2 ++ () Educ , the standard error is 0.192.
These standard errors are calculated using the approximation formula suggested by Kmenta
[1971].
18. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this latter possibility.
19. This calculation and other comparable standard errors subsequently given in this paper are based
on the approximation formula suggested by Kmenta [1971]. Selected estimates of the price elastic-
ity of disposal demand in the literature are as follows: Skumatz [1990], –0.14; Podolsky and Spiegel
[1998], –0.39; and Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000], –0.28.
20. Although the results indicate that recycling triggers this disposal decline, we cannot identify the
exact disposition of the MSW no longer being disposed due to the indirect effect. If generation is
unchanged or increased by a feedback effect as suggested by Hong [1999], then the indirect effect
would give rise to an increased amount of illegal disposal. If generation declines sufficiently, it is
possible that illegal disposal is unchanged. However, because data on this elusive activity are not
available, only inferences such as these are possible.
21. Den, FreqDISP, and Grant are statistically significant using a one-tailed test. Note that their alge-
braic signs validate our hypothesis about the influence of each.
22. It should be noted that the quadratic relationship is significant only at the 10 percent level. At
lower levels of significance, the estimated relationship between education and recycling becomes
linear.
23. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the influence of this possibility.
REFERENCES
Callan, S. J. and Thomas, J. M. The Impact of State and Local Policies on a Community’s Recycling
Effort. Eastern Economic Journal, Fall 1997, 411-424.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, Department
of Environmental Protection (DEP). Toward a System of Integrated Solid Waste Manage-
ment: The Commonwealth Master Plan. Boston: DEP, June 1990.
____________. Active MSW Landfills in Massachusetts. August 30, 1994.
____________. Listing of MRF in Massachusetts. FAX dated May 31, 1996.
____________. FY97 Municipal Recycling Grant Awards. 1997.
____________. 1998 Municipal Recycling Data Sheet (for Recycling Grant Application and Report
Card.) 1998.
____________. 1999 Municipal Recycling Composting Guide, 1999.
____________. Municipalities With Pay-As-You-Throw Programs, July 2000.
____________. Beyond 2000 Solid Waste Master Plan: A Policy Framework. Boston: DEP, December
20, 2000.
Fullerton, D. and Kinnaman, T. C. Household Responses to Pricing Garbage by the Bag. American
Economic Review, September 1996, 971-84.240 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Granzin, K. L. and Olsen, J. E. Characterizing Participants in Activities Protecting the Environment:
A Focus on Donating, Recycling, and Conservation Behaviors. Journal of Public Policy and
Marketing, Fall 1991, 1-27.
Hausman, J.A. Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, November 1978, 1251-71.
Hong, S. The Effects of Unit Pricing System Upon Household Solid Waste Management: The Korean
Experience. Journal of Environmental Management,  September 1999, 1-10.
Hong, S. and Adams, R. M. Household Responses to Price Incentives for Recycling: Some Further
Evidence. Land Economics, November 1999, 505-14.
Horner, E. R., ed. Massachusetts Municipal Profiles: 1994-95. Palo Alto, Ca: Information Publications,
1994.
Hui, G. Jr. Pay-As-You-Throw Continues to Grow. Waste Age, May 1999, 34-35.
Jenkins, R. The Economics of Solid Waste Reduction. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing
Limited, 1993.
Kinnaman, T. C. and Fullerton, D. Garbage and Recycling with Endogenous Local Policy. Journal
of Urban Economics, November 2000, 419-42.
Kmenta, J. Elements of Econometrics. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1971.
Lansana, F. M. Distinguishing Potential Recyclers from Nonrecyclers: A Basis for Developing Recy-
cling Strategies. Journal of Environmental Education, Winter 1992, 16-23.
Maddala, G.S. Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.
Miranda, M. L. and Aldy, J. E. Unit Pricing of Residential Municipal Solid Waste: Lessons from Nine
Case Study Communities. Journal of Environmental Management, January 1998, 79-93.
Nestor, D. V. and Podolsky, M. J. Assessing Incentive-Based Environmental Policies For Reducing
Household Waste Disposal. Contemporary Economic Policy, October 1998, 401-11.
Pindyck, R. S. and Rubinfeld, D. L. Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts, 4th ed. Boston:
Irwin McGraw-Hill, 1998.
Podolsky, M. J. and Spiegel, M. Municipal Waste Disposal: Unit Pricing and Recycling Opportunities.
Public Works Management and Policy, July 1998, 27-39.
Rathje, W. L. and Thompson, B. The Milwaukee Garbage Project, in Report for the Solid Waste
Council of the Paper Industry. Prepared by Le Project du Garbage, University of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ, 1981.
Repetto, R., Dower, R. C., Jenkins, R. and Geoghegan, J. Green Fees: How a Tax Shift Can Work
for the Environment and the Economy. Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 1992.
Richardson, R. A. and Havlicek, J. Jr. An Analysis of the Generation of Household Solid Waste
from Consumption. Research Bulletin, No. 920. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, March
1975.
____________. Economic Analysis of the Composition of Household Solid Wastes. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management, March 1978, 103-11.
Saltzman, C., Duggal, V. G. and Williams, M. L. Income and the Recycling Effort: A Maximization
Problem. Energy Economics, January 1993, 33-38.
Skumatz, L. A. Volume-Based Rates in Solid Waste: Seattle’s Experience. Seattle: Seattle Solid Waste
Utility, 1990.
Smith, V. K. Does Education Induce People to Improve the Environment? Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management, Fall 1995, 599-604.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Population and Housing, 1990
(United States): Summary Tape File. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response.
Charging Households for Waste Collection and Disposals: The Effects of Weight or Volume-
Based Pricing on Solid Waste Management. Washington, DC: U.S. EPA, 1990.
Van Houtven, G. L. and Morris, G. E. Household Behavior Under Alternative Pay-As-You-Throw
Systems for Solid Waste Disposal. Land Economics, November 1999, 515-37.
Van Liere, K. D. and Dunlap, R. E. The Social Bases of Environmental Concern: A Review of
Hypotheses, Explanations and Empirical Evidence. Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1980,
181-97.
Zellner A. and Theil, H. Three Stage Least Squares: Simultaneous Estimation of Simultaneous
Equations. Econometrica, January 1962, 63-68.